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Abstract 
In the last decades there has been a gradual liberalisation of international air transport markets 
through the implementation of open skies agreements which seek the deregulation of the air 
transport industry and consequently the functioning of the market in a freer way. The 
objective of this work is to study the effects of an open skies agreement in order to understand 
if the airlines and the consumers will benefit after the market deregulation. With this purpose, 
we developed a Cournot model to compare the initial situation (without agreement) and the 
situation after the implementation of the open skies agreement.   
Based on the model developed it can be concluded that the prices on international market 
segments where competition increases should decline after market liberalisation, thus 
benefiting consumers. Regarding the incumbent airlines in the market, an open skies 
agreement should jeopardize the airlines that fail to operate new routes after the agreement, 
leading to decreased profits. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades we have been witnessing significant changes in the international air 
transport industry, namely due to the implementation of bilateral open skies agreements 
whose aim is air transport industry liberalisation. However, regarding multilateral agreements 
or agreements that cover a large number of countries, open skies is a recent concept, existing 
only for a while in a small number of countries.  
According to Button (2009), open skies is a concept which emerged in the late 1970s when 
the United States (US) started to liberalize the domestic cargo market and the domestic 
passenger sector. This concept means then the liberalisation of the rules and regulations of 
airlines, with the aim of creating a free-market environment for the airline industry, with less 
state intervention. The open skies agreements include several “freedoms of the air”, whereby 
the agreements that include more freedoms are broader and they have more impact on the 
economy (ICAO, 2004).  
Since the development of concepts such as open skies, we have seen a gradual liberalisation 
of the international air transport market that has benefited the travelling public (Button, 2009). 
Obviously, not all open skies agreements have had the same impact or the same importance 
on the international economy (Pitfield, 2009). Among the most relevant to the functioning of 
the global  economy we found the following agreements: the European Union (EU) open 
skies agreement which has liberalized the air transport market among all countries of the 
European Community, yielding the “European Common Aviation Area” (ECAA); the open 
skies agreement between the EU and the US which has deserved more attention in the 
literature due to it being the broadest; the ASEAN open skies agreement (between ten 
countries in southwest Asia, although there is pressure to extend the agreement to other Asian 
countries such as India and China); or even the open skies agreement between the EU and 
Canada (Pitfield, 2009). It is also noteworthy that there are several current negotiations 
among countries or blocs with the objective of establishing a freer air transport market, as 
well as the existence of many other similar agreements all over the world (Pitfield, 2009). 
In the EU, the implementation of open skies was made in several phases: 1987, 1990 and 
1993 (Oum and Yu, 1995). Note that in 1987 just twelve countries were members of the 
European Community, therefore currently this open skies agreement is much broader, 
including the twenty seven members of the European Union. 
Button (2009) refers that the opening up of the North Atlantic market (through the EU-US 
open skies agreement) is one of the major liberalisation measures since the removal of 
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barriers to the EU market, so it is very important to understand the effects of this agreement. 
Based on international trade theory, the Brattle Group (2002) emphasise that liberalisation 
would increase efficiency and benefit consumers in multiple ways. Also Fu et al. (2010) 
mention that liberalisation allows airlines to compete more efficiently, reduce prices and 
increase quality (e.g. in terms of flight frequency). In this way, the present investigation aims 
at understanding the potential economic effects of an open skies agreement, notably on 
competition and welfare. At this level, it is interesting to ascertain whether consumers will 
benefit from prices reductions. This follows from the effects of open skies agreements on 
competition (Fu et al., 2010). The literature suggests that these effects are positive, increasing 
the number of companies and the number of flights offered on the routes covered by the 
agreements (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2007; Fu et al., 2010). 
With the purpose of examining the effects of open skies agreements we have developed a 
theoretical model to compare the situation pre-agreement with several situations post-
agreement (including cases of competition in substitutes and complementary services), using 
the Cournot model with two market segments and analysing the case of such an agreement 
between the European Union (EU) and Brazil. The choice of this particular case relates to the 
fact that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study to examine the effects of an open 
skies agreement between these economic areas and the fact that such an agreement is being 
studied, and is expected to materialise in the near future. Moreover, this agreement would 
affect Portugal and its national airline (TAP) since many of the flights between the EU and 
Brazil are flights between Portugal and Brazil.
1
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proceeds with a brief literature review regarding 
the expected effects of an open skies agreement (Section 2.1.) and some empirical evidence 
(Section 2.2.). In Section 3 we develop a theoretical model that allows us to study the effects 
of a open skies agreement: in Section 3.1. we present the assumptions and hypotheses of the 
model; in Section 3.2. we determine the equilibrium before the implementation of an open 
skies agreement; in Section 3.3. we determine the equilibrium after the implementation of an 
open skies agreement under three hypotheses; in Section 3.4. we analyse the effects of the 
agreement. Finally, in Section 4, we present the main conclusions, limitations and possible 
avenues of analysis in future work. 
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 "The South Atlantic was (in 2010) the most representative sector of the line network, reaching 42.2%, 4.2 
pp more than in 2009, continuing to exceed the size of the sector in European network." (TAP, 2010, p. 55). 
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2. Effects of an open skies agreement 
2.1. Expected effects  
Generally, the existing literature considers that the sequence of effects caused by the 
implementation of an open skies policy is similar to that shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Effects of an open skies agreement 
 Source: Own elaboration according to literature review. 
Some authors (Brattle Group, 2002; Sørenson and Dakes, 2005; Fu et al., 2010) consider that 
an open skies agreement should increase the number of airlines in the market, reflecting an 
increase in competition in the air transport market. This increase reflects the decrease of 
market restrictions, which should cause a restructuring of the air transport industry, allowing 
new airlines to enter liberalised segments of the market. On the other hand, according to Fu et 
al. (2010), this liberalisation should allow airlines to restructure and optimise their networks, 
becoming viable to operate routes between two locations that were not possible before due to 
the small number of passengers for that route. This restructuring increases the number of 
possible routes and the number of flights available in a given market (InterVistas, 2006; 
Button, 2009), thereby increasing the competition in those market segments. 
According to the Brattle Group (2002), Booz Allen Hamilton (2007), and Fu et al. (2010), a 
second effect of an open skies agreement will be the increased efficiency of airlines and the 
consequent reduction of airlines costs. According to the Brattle Group (2002) the increased 
efficiency results from the fact that with the liberalisation more efficient airlines will replace 
less efficient ones or less efficient airlines may adopt a more efficient behaviour. For Booz 
Allen Hamilton (2007), liberalisation can result in productivity gains and consequent 
reduction in costs due to the ability to restructure across national borders and the possibility to 
make deeper alliances. Also Fu et al. (2010) consider that liberalisation increases airlines 
efficiency through several ways: the optimisation of an airlines network and the increased 
competition which force the merger or even bankruptcy of less efficient firms and the 
adoption of new business models and innovations.  
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Ultimately, some authors (Brattle Group, 2002; Adler and Hashai, 2005; Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 2007; Pels, 2009; Fu et al., 2010) refer that an open skies agreement should cause a 
price reduction in the liberalised market. According to the Brattle Group (2002), this 
reduction results from increased airlines efficiency and extensive cost reductions. According 
to Fu et al. (2010), price reduction is caused by the introduction of more efficient behaviour in 
airlines, which in turn results from increased competition. On the other hand, the cost 
reduction should stimulate price reduction in the liberalised market (Adler and Hashai, 2005; 
Booz Allen Hamilton, 2007; Pels, 2009). Thus, according to the referred authors, an open 
skies agreement should lead to price reduction resulting from the increased competition, cost 
reduction and increased efficiency. These effects are a well-known result of the literature of 
oligopoly models.  
It is noted, however, that the effects mentioned above are not automatic. There are several 
factors that can hinder the achievement of these effects, such as: some strategic behaviour that 
incumbents can adopt with the purpose of preventing or hindering the entry of airlines to the 
market (e.g. code share agreements (Brueckner, 2001),
2
 the restructuration of networks and 
frequent flier programs (Agarregabiria and Ho, 2010)), natural monopolies (Agarregabiria and 
Ho, 2010), limited airports’ capacity (so that not all airlines can start flights at the same time) 
(Barbot, 2004), among others.
2.2. Some evidence regarding the effects of open skies agreements 
To complement this study and better understand the effects of an open skies agreement, we 
will present some evidence regarding the effects of the agreement found in air transport 
markets. 
Cosmas et al. (2010) analysed the effects of open skies agreements on service levels in 
transatlantic aviation markets. Measuring transatlantic service levels in terms of passenger 
enplanements, number of city pairs, departures and the number of carriers providing 
transatlantic service (the latter can be considered one indicator of the level of competition in 
the market) the authors conclude that open skies agreements between European countries and 
the US have resulted in both increases and decreases in service levels. For example, with 
regard to the number of competitors, of the 22 countries with US open skies agreements in 
place by 2007, only two demonstrated overall increases in the number of competitors and five 
 
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Code share agreements or code share alliances are agreements established between airlines in which airlines 
agree on sell flights operated by the partner, allowing a coordination of prices and schedules (Brueckner, 2001).
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demonstrated overall reductions. Cosmas et al. (2010) also obtained several inconclusive 
cases. 
According to Cristea and Hummels (2011), since 1993 the US has signed more than 90 
bilateral open skies agreements. During this period in which there was a gradual liberalisation 
in the US international air market the number of passengers in this market has increased due 
to the appearance of new routes and also due to air traffic growth on existing routes. This 
increase will be due both to the increasing of the frequency and to changes in prices charged 
by airlines (Cristea and Hummels, 2011). Note, however, that changes in the regulation of this 
industry require time for the international markets to adjust and meet new equilibrium levels. 
Thus, airlines will require time to reorganise their networks (Cristea and Hummels, 2011). 
Studying the effects of bilateral open skies between the US and its partners, conducted 
between 1992 and 2007, Cristea and Hummels (2011) used 599,533 observations, which 
covered the period between 1993 and 2008. The sample relates to 50,000 routes between pairs 
of airports, one of them always being a US airport, and there are about 12 observations for 
each route. The authors found evidence that the implementation of an open skies agreement 
should lead to a significant increase in outbound air traffic. According to Cristea and 
Hummels (2011), five or more years after the agreement is signed, this traffic should be about 
18% higher in liberalised markets, compared with non-liberalised markets. This increase is 
explained in part (40%) by the introduction of new nonstop routes to the liberalised 
international markets and 60% of this increase will be due to the growth in traffic on the 
routes previously offered. The traffic from the US to countries signatories of an open skies 
agreement is expected to be 11.3% higher on average than the traffic on routes similar but 
whose target markets are regulated (Cristea and Hummels, 2011). This increase will be due to 
improvements in the quality of services such as the increased frequency of flights or better 
coordination of flight schedules. On the contrary, the impact of such an agreement in the 
volume of incoming traffic in the US is negligible, almost nil suggesting, once again, the need 
of time for market and airlines to readjust (Cristea and Hummels, 2011). 
Besides the reason given by the authors, on might question the reason for the imbalance 
between the change in volume of traffic in and out. Another factor that can cause this 
imbalance is the fact that North American airlines are more efficient than the airlines of 
countries with which the US concluded open skies agreements. In fact, Oum and Yu (1995) 
argue that before the EU deregulation European airlines were considered inefficient and 
although European airlines have increased their efficiency since 1987, they continued in 1993 
to be less efficient than North American companies. According to Oum and Yu (1995), also 
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Asian airlines were in 1993, substantially less efficient than American competitors. This may 
have forced the European and Asian airlines to reduce or maintain their quantities. These 
findings suggest that efficiency asymmetries can lead to agreements that benefit the more 
efficient companies, who operate less costly and therefore can offer better prices, to the 
detriment of less efficient companies. Agreements can, therefore, introduce asymmetric 
effects, benefiting some companies while hurting others. 
With regard to prices charged by airlines, Cristea and Hummels (2011) find evidence that the 
liberalisation of an air transport market should lead to a small direct effect (decrease of 1.6% 
on average) due to factors such as increased competition or cost synergies caused by the 
formation of airline alliances. Such synergies arise mainly from better coordination of 
services, through restructuring of networks. In addition to this decrease in prices (regardless 
of the initial level of prices), the authors also found strong evidence that the demand for 
international flights is expected to increase. Cristea and Humels (2011) conclude that 
passengers travelling to the US should pay prices about 4% lower, due to the liberalisation of 
the market, while passengers who start their trip in the US will not see the prices of their 
flights changed significantly. The effect of an Open Skies agreement for these passengers is 
insignificant and close to zero. So it takes some time for the benefits derived from a 
liberalisation of air transport markets to affect the prices of flights to other countries (Cristea 
and Hummels, 2011). However, and according to the same authors, liberalisation of an air 
transport market should lead, in the longer term, to lower prices of flights to regulated 
markets by about 32% due to the direct effect on the price, the effect of service quality and the 
effect of the airlines' networks restructuring. 
In summary, the study of Cristea and Hummels (2011) suggests that the implementation of an 
open skies agreement leads to an increase in traffic and a decrease in market prices. However, 
it takes some time (five years or more) for all the benefits from the adoption of such an 
agreement to actually occur. However, this econometric study was based on a sample of 
forecasts. For this reason, there are limitations to this analysis, such as the fact that they had 
not contemplated strategic behaviour, such as collusion, alliances, or other behaviour of 
incumbent firms aimed at preventing the entry of new firms to the market. 
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3. A Cournot model for analysing the effects of an open skies agreement  
3.1. Assumptions and hypotheses 
The present study aims at studying the effects of open skies agreements on prices and airlines 
profits. Thus, we develop a theoretical model to compare the situation pre-agreement with 
several post-agreement situations (including cases of competition in substitutes and 
complementary services), using the Cournot model with three market segments and analysing 
the case of an open skies agreement between the EU and Brazil. To the best of our 
knowledge there are no models for open skies agreements, so we base our model in two 
models of code share, developed by Brueckner (2001) and Bilotkach (2007). Note that the 
major difference between the two situations is that in the case of Open Skies a larger number 
of companies can operate a given route, while in the case of code share the number of 
companies is the same, but an airline operates flights that may also be sold by another airline. 
In the case of code share there is no increased competition, but the quantities can increase and 
prices decrease. It is in this aspect that the two situations become similar.  
Brueckner (2001) aims at understanding the effects of a substitute code share agreement while 
Bilotkach (2007) addresses the complementary partnerships.
4
 In both studies the authors used 
the Cournot model with multiple market segments. Brueckner (2001) presents a model with 
two firms operating in various market segments (16) but competing in a single segment, the 
interhub market (baseline situation). The hypotheses tested by Brueckner (2001) relate to the 
implementation of a code share agreement between the two airlines and in the second 
hypothesis also take into account the economies of scale resulting from this partnership. 
Moreover, Bilotkach (2007) presents a model with only three market segments (one domestic 
and two international) and three airlines operating. It is noteworthy that these airlines are not 
equal. While in the initial situation firm 1 is domestic and operates in the three market 
segments, firm 2 is also domestic but operates only domestic flights in the domestic segment, 
and firm 3 is international and cannot operate flights on the domestic route, operating thus in 
only one market segment (Bilotkach, 2007). The Bilotkach (2007) hypothesis aimed at testing 
the effects of code share agreements (partnership between firms 2 and 3) and semi-
complementary (partnerships between firms 1 and 2 or 1 and 3). 
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 It is noteworthy that there is still no open skies agreement between the EU and Brazil. However, an agreement 
between these two markets is being studied. 
4
 Substitute code share concerns partnerships between airlines in parallel services, that is, substitute routes 
(Brueckner, 2001). Complementary code share relates to partnerships between airlines in complementary 
services, so to routes that complement each other (Bilotkach, 2007). 
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However, the objective of the present study concerns the analysis of the effects of an open 
skies agreement and not a code share partnership, so that the model used and the hypotheses 
tested are not the same as mentioned above. Although we also use the Cournot model, the 
situations to test are quite different, the objective of this study being to analyse if an open 
skies agreement, allowing the entry of new airlines in the international markets liberalised and 
thus increasing competition, will result in lower prices and an increase in consumer surplus. 
Therefore, the hypotheses tested relate to the entry of airlines in certain market segments and 
the implementation of a collusion between two airlines, one of which is the incumbent. Some 
of the differences of the model used in this study lie in the variables used. On the one hand, 
here there is not a total cost function that includes economies of density, as in the two models 
analysed, but, for reasons of simplification, we assume constant marginal costs of each 
airline, represented by c.
5
 On the other hand, the inverse demand function of a particular 
airline (or price) is defined as a function of the traffic satisfied by its competitors (Cournot 
competition), which also does not occur in the two models mentioned above. 
The network admitted in this model is intended to represent the international market between 
Portugal and Brazil, and consists of three market segments (Lisbon - Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo - 
Curitiba and Lisbon - Curitiba) according to Figure 2. Thus, our study aims at analysing the 
impact of a hypothetical open skies agreement between the EU and Brazil, having been 
chosen a complementary route (Sao Paulo - Curitiba) which has considerable traffic.
6
 It is 
assumed that in this market only three airlines (TAP, TAM and GOL) operate, the first being 
a Portuguese airline and the last two Brazilian airlines.
7
Figure 2: Network structure before the implementation of the open skies agreement 
Source: Own elaboration
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 And also because in the case of code share there is a firm that operates flights of two airlines, which can lead to 
economies of density, while in the case of open skies it is the competition between firms that will lead to lower 
prices, rather than the costs. 
6
 Curitiba, with about 1.8 million inhabitants and with a distance of 359 kilometers from Guarulhos, is 
(following Manaus) the second largest Brazilian city among the cities that TAP does not offer direct flights.  
7
 Although several airlines (TAM, GOL, Webjet and TRIP) operate this route on a regular basis, to simplify this 
number was reduced to two firms.  
Firm 1 - TAP 
Firm 2 - TAM 
Firm 3 - GOL 
Sao Paulo 
Curitiba 
Lisbon 
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As we can see from Figure 2, in the initial situation TAP (firm 1) is present in the market 
segment between Lisbon and Sao Paulo (international route), while TAM (firm 2) and GOL 
(firm 3) operate flights between Sao Paulo and Curitiba, and the routes Lisbon - Sao Paulo 
and Sao Paulo - Curitiba are complementary services.
8
 We can see, therefore, that none of the 
airlines operate on the route Lisbon - Curitiba. Thus, a passenger wishing to undertake a 
journey between Lisbon and Curitiba would have to buy two tickets, traveling with firm 1 in 
the market segment Lisbon - Sao Paulo and changing planes in Sao Paulo. In the market 
segment Sao Paulo – Curitiba the passenger may choose to travel with the airline 2 or 3. 
Hence, in this scenario, the route Lisbon - Curitiba is an interline market. Thus, the market 
Lisbon - Sao Paulo is a monopoly of one firm, while the market Sao Paulo - Curitiba is an 
oligopoly where firms 2 and 3 operate. 
To understand the impact of the effects of an Open Skies agreement, we test three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): firm 1 enters the market segment Sao Paulo - Curitiba, allowing the firm 
to be present in all three market segments (the international segments Lisbon - Sao Paulo and 
Lisbon - Curitiba and the domestic segment Sao Paulo - Curitiba). So while firm 1 is the only 
one to operate international flights (monopolies), market competition in the market Sao Paulo 
- Curitiba increases (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Network structure  after the implementation of the open skies agreement, under H1
Source: Own elaboration
Hypothesis 2 (H2): firm 1 enters in the market Sao Paulo - Curitiba and firm 2 enters in the 
market Lisbon - Sao Paulo. Thus, some competition is introduced in the market Lisbon - 
Curitiba (compared with H1), this route being operated by firms 1 and 2. Moreover, firm 3 
continues to operate flights only in the domestic route, Sao Paulo – Curitiba (see Figure 4). 
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 From Figure 2, we also notice that the route between Lisbon and Sao Paulo (long course) is quite longer than 
the Brazilian domestic route (short / medium-haul).
Firm 1 - TAP 
Firm 2 - TAM 
Firm 3 - GOL 
Sao Paulo 
Curitiba 
Lisbon 

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Figure 4: Network structure after the implementation of the open skies agreement, under H2 
Source: Own elaboration
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Collusion between firms 1 and 2 in order to operate flights in the market 
Lisbon - Curitiba, offering to consumers the two complementary services (Lisbon - Sao Paulo 
route and Sao Paulo – Curitiba route). With the collusion, firms involved should jointly make 
decisions regarding the definition of the quantities to provide for both, so these airlines should 
agree on the quantities to maximise the joint profit (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Network structure after the implementation of the Open Skies agreement, under H3 
Source: Own elaboration
From these hypotheses, we intend to understand the effects of an open skies agreement at the 
level of prices, profits of airlines and also investigate whether consumers will be favoured by 
the implementation of the agreement. In this way we start by determining the equilibrium in 
the initial situation, i.e. before the agreement (Section 3.2.), and then we analyze the situation 
after the implementation of the agreement under the three hypotheses presented (Section 3.3.). 
According to the literature we are interested in comparing the consumer surplus, which can be 
done by comparing the prices or quantities, and the corporate profits. 
3.2. Equilibrium before the implementation of an open skies agreement 
To understand the impact of the effects of an open skies agreement, we used the following 
variables: price, denoted by p, quantities represented by x, y and z (where x represents the 
demand for the route between Lisbon and Sao Paulo, y is the demand for the route between 
Sao Paulo and Curitiba, and z is the demand for the route Lisbon - Curitiba), marginal costs, 
designated by c, and total profits of each firm, represented by .  
Firm 1 - TAP 
Firm 2 - TAM 
Firm 3 - GOL 
Sao Paulo 
Curitiba 
Lisbon 
Sao Paulo 
Curitiba 
Lisbon 
Firm m (resulting from 
collusion between firm 
1 and 2) 
Firm 3 - GOL 
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In the initial situation, that is without an open skies agreement, firm 1 operates flights only in 
the market Lisbon - Sao Paulo (LG), while the route Sao Paulo - Curitiba (GC) is operated by 
firms 2 and 3. In this case, this is a game played in 2 stages. In the first stage, firm 1 
determines prices or quantities to offer in the market LG, and the firm anticipates the price 
charged by the other two companies in the market GC. It is noteworthy that it makes no 
difference if firm 1 determines prices or quantities because this airline is monopolist in this 
market. In the second stage, firms 2 and 3 compete in quantities (Cournot competition), in the 
market Sao Paulo – Curitiba (GC), knowing the price for the market Lisbon - Sao Paulo. 
Thus, in the first stage of this game the reverse demand function in the market segment LG, 
, will be used : 
     (1) 
Where a is the reserve price in the market LG and x1 is the total traffic on this route (which 
will be served only by firm 1). In the second stage, the reverse demand function for the 
market segment GC, , is given by: 
  	  
  
  (2)
Where b represents the reserve price in the market GC, y2 and y3 represent the demand for this 
segment (GC) satisfied by firms 2 and 3, respectively. Due to the difference in distances of 
the two routes, since Lisbon - Sao Paulo is long-haul and GC is short / medium haul, we 
assume that a>b. We also assume that b>c (and consequently, a>c) otherwise firms would not 
have an incentive to produce. 
Note that, in the initial situation, there is no airline flying the entire route Lisbon – Curitiba 
(LC), so the price in this market, designated by pLC, is given by the sum of pL and pC. 
In regards to the airlines profits, they are given by the functions ,  and  (profits of firm 1, 
2 and 3, respectively), that is:  
     (3)
    
 (4) 
    
 (5) 
In the first stage of the game, firms 1, 2 and 3 compete on price for the segments LG and GC, 
complementary of LG. In the second stage, firms 2 and 3 compete in quantities in the GC 
market. Thus, in the market LG firm 1 demand is composed of two types of consumers: those 


who fly only LG (with the reverse demand     ) and those who fly LG and then GC 
(with reverse demand       	  ), that is:  
        	     (6) 
Substituting (6) into equation (3) we obtain the following expression for the profit function of 
firm 1: 
      	     (7) 
Firm 1 maximizes its profit on price, getting the firm 1 best reply function pL(pC):  
 


  

	  

  

  (8) 
Regarding the GC market, total demand in this market (y) is the sum of two components: the 
market demand of LC in the segment GC (
  
    	    ) and market demand 
of GC (
  
  	  ).
9
 Thus: 

  
    	     (9) 
Solving equation (9) in order to pC we obtain: 
 


  	  

 


(10) 
Replacing (10) in (4) and (5) (firms 2 and 3 profits, respectively) and maximising the 
quantities, we obtain the following best reply function for firm 2 and 3 (equations (11) and 
(12), respectively): 

 


  	    


 


  (11) 

 


  	    


 


 (12) 
Solving the system composed by equations (11) and (12) we obtain:  

  
 


  

	  

  

 (13) 
Finally, we obtain the total demand in the GC market, y:

  
  
 


  

	  

  

. (14) 
Replacing (14) in equation (10) we get: 
 


  	     (15) 
 
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 Note that y2=y2C+y2L and y3=y3C+y3L. 


Equation (15) represents a kind of best reply function of market Sao Paulo – Curitiba to 
market Lisbon – Sao Paulo.  
Solving the system resulting from equations (8) and (15) we obtain:  
 


  	   (16) 
 


  	   (17) 
Equations (16) and (17) are the equilibrium solutions for prices. In this way, pLC is given by: 
     


  	   (18) 
Replacing (17) in equation (13) we obtain: 

  
 


  	    (19) 
Replacing (16) and (19) in equation (4) or (5) we obtain firms’ 2 and 3 profits: 
   

!"
  	    (20) 
Finally, regarding firm 1, by substituting (16) and (17) in equation (6) we get: 
 


  	  # (21) 
Replacing (17) and (21) in equation (3) we obtain firm’s 1 profits: 
 

!"
  	  # (22) 
To sum up, from the calculations made for this baseline scenario we obtain the equilibrium 
prices for the various markets and the profits of the three firms, which are shown in Table 1, 
which also presents these variables for the three hypotheses considered with implementation 
of the open skies agreement. These are explored in the next Section. 
3.3. Equilibrium under open skies agreement 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
As mentioned previously, the hypothesis H1 relates to the entry of firm 1 in the segment GC, 
everything else is held constant (Figure 3). In this scenario it is assumed that firms 2 and 3 are 
not prepared to operate flights on international routes (because they do not have sufficient 
conditions to operate this type flights, for example, they have no aircraft with enough size, or 
they do not have slots or supporting infrastructure in Lisbon). Thus, the route Lisbon - Sao 


Paulo remains a monopoly of firm 1 and this firm becomes the only airline to offer flights to 
Lisbon - Curitiba. Note that Lisbon - Sao Paulo and Lisbon - Curitiba are two different 
products because the route Lisbon - Curitiba is not limited to the route Lisbon - Sao Paulo, it 
also contains the route Sao Paulo - Curitiba, therefore being the set of two complementary 
services. On the other hand, firm 1 can also to carry other passengers of the route Sao Paulo - 
Curitiba. In other words, firm 1 offers three services: Lisbon - Sao Paulo, Lisbon - Curitiba 
(selling a single ticket) and Sao Paulo - Curitiba, where the first two are operated as a 
monopoly and the latter in competition with the other two firms. 
This hypothesis will be examined in a game in two stages. In the first stage firm 1 determines 
the price (or quantity, for the reasons given above) in the segments LG and Lisbon - Curitiba, 
anticipating the quantity (and also the price) of the segment GC and incorporate it in its best 
reply function. In this case, the prices of Lisbon - Sao Paulo and Lisbon - Curitiba are 
independent of the prices of Sao Paulo - Curitiba. At this stage of the game, demand of 
market LG , pL(x1), is still given by equation (1) but the reverse demand function for the 
market Lisbon - Curitiba (which is operated only by the firm 1) is given by: 
    	  $ (23)
Where a and b have the same meaning mentioned above and z1 is the quantity demanded 
(traffic) of the route Lisbon – Curitiba (LC) which is satisfied by firm 1.
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In the second stage, which regards the choice of the quantities offered in the market segment 
GC, the three firms compete in quantities. So, in this case, the reverse demand function of the 
market segment GC is given by: 
  	  
  
  
  (24) 
y1, y2 and y3 represent the traffic (demand) of the route Sao Paulo - Curitiba satisfied by firms 
1, 2 and 3, respectively. Moreover, profits of firm 2 and 3 are given, respectively, by the 
functions (4) and (5), while the profit of firm 1 is given by: 
        $    
 (25) 
In the first stage of the game, firm 1 determines the price (or quantity) in the segments LG 
and LC anticipating its quantity and so the price of the GC segment, while in the second stage 
firm 1 competes in quantities (Cournot competition) with firms 2 and 3 in the market GC. 
Replacing (1), (23) and (24) in the equation (25), firm 1 profit is given by: 
 
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 Note that  %  %     (  is the price for the segment LC). 


          	  $  $  	  
  
  
  
 (26) 
As the market LG is a monopoly, there is no difference in maximising profit in price or 
quantity, so firm 1 maximises its profit in the three quantities, obtaining: 
 


  

 (27) 
$ 


  

	  

 (28) 

 


	  

  


 



 (29) 
As markets LG and LC are independent of the GC market, now we get the solutions for the 
quantities of these markets and respective prices. In fact, replacing (27) in the equation (1) 
and (28) in the equation (23) we get the following prices: 
 


  

 (30) 
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

  

	  

 (31) 
Replacing (27) and (28) in equation (26) and simplifying we obtain firm 1’s profit: 
 


    

  	    	  
  
  
  
 (32) 
Additionally, replacing (24) in equation (4) and (5) we obtain firm 2 and 3 profits, 
respectively, that operate in the segment GC:  
  	  
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  
 (33) 
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  
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  
 (34) 
Each firm maximises its profit (given by equations (32), (33) and (34)) in quantities, so we 
obtain the best reply functions for firm 1, 2 and 3, respectively: 
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 (37) 
Solving the three best reply function we obtain the following quantities:  
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 
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
 (38) 
Replacing (38) in equation (24) we obtain the price of the market GC: 


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
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	   (39) 
Replacing (38) in equations (32), (33) and (34) we obtain the profits of firm 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively: 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
The second hypothesis tested (see Figure 4) concerns the entry of firm 1in the route Sao Paulo 
- Curitiba and the entry of firm 2 in the international route (assuming that only firm 3 is not 
prepared to operate flights on this route). Therefore, firms 1 and 2 compete in the market LG 
and Lisbon - Curitiba, while in the market CG the three airlines compete. In this case, we 
have a game in two stages. In the first stage firms 1 and 2 compete in quantities (Cournot 
competition) in the segments LG and Lisbon - Curitiba, anticipating their quantities and thus 
the price of the segment GC. For this reason, in the first stage there are two market segments 
with two demand functions: the inverse demand function in the segment LG () and the 
inverse demand function in the segment Lisbon - Curitiba (), which are given by equations 
(43) and (44), respectively. 
        (43) 
    	  $  $ (44) 
Where a and b have the meanings stated above, x1 and x2 represent the demand of the market 
LG satisfied by firm 1 and 2, respectively, and z1 and z2 represent the demand in the market 
Lisbon - Curitiba met by firms 1 and 2, respectively.  
Moreover, in the second stage the three firms compete in quantities in the segment GC. As 
this scenario is the same as shown in the route Sao Paulo – Curitiba in the hypothesis H1, 
demand will be given by equation (24). In this scenario the profit functions of firms 1 and 3 
are given, respectively, by equations (25) and (5), while the profit of firm 2 is given by: 
        $    
  (45) 
Replacing (43) and (44) in equations (25) and (45) we obtain the profit function of firm 1 and 
2, respectively: 
	

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  
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 (47) 
These two airlines maximise profits in the quantities, obtaining the following best reply 
functions: 
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Solving a system with the six best reply function we obtain:   
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Replacing (54), (55) and (56) in equations (43), (24) and (44) we obtain the prices in the 
market LG (pL), GC (pC) and LC (pLC), respectively: 
 


   (57) 
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Replacing (54), (55), (56) and (58) in equations (46), (47) and (5) we obtain the profits for 
firms 1, 2 and 3, respectively: 
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Maximising firms’ profits in, respectively, y1, y2 and y3, we get three best reply functions:  
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Solving the system with the three best reply functions we obtain: 
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Replacing (66) in equation (58) we obtain the price in the market: 
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Replacing (66) in equations (60), (61) and (62) we obtain the profits of firms 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
The H3 hypothesis concerns the scenario where firms 1 and 2 collude and therefore make the 
decisions relating to their quantities together in order to maximise joint profit. In the initial 
scenario, these two firms were taking independent decisions, maximising their individual 
profit. Thus, there is only competition in the market GC, where firm m (firm resulting from 
the collusion between firms 1 and 2) and firm 3 compete. In this case, there are two firms (as 
was the case in the initial situation), but one of them (firm 2) provides this service in 
conjunction with the complementary service Lisbon - Sao Paulo supplied by firm 1. In the 
case of the route Lisbon - Curitiba, although firms 1 and 2 are present there is no competition, 
so it is a monopoly of airline m. Again, this is a game in 2 stages. In the first stage, firm m
determines prices (or quantities) in the segments LG and Lisbon - Curitiba, anticipating the 
quantity and also the price in the segment GC. Thus, the inverse demand function in the 
segments LG and Lisbon - Curitiba are given, respectively, by the equations (70) and (71). 
    ( (70)
    	  $( (71)


Where xm is the demand satisfied by firm m in the market segment LG and zm is the demand 
satisfied by firm m in the market Lisbon - Curitiba. Moreover, in the second stage, the two 
airlines (firm m and 3) compete in quantities (Cournot competition) in the route Sao Paulo - 
Curitiba and therefore choose the quantity to offer in this market segment. Thus, the reverse 
demand of the market segment GC is given by: 
  	  
)  
 (72) 
ym and y3 represent the demand, in the market segment GC, satisfied by firm m and 3, 
respectively. The profit of firm m (firms 1 and 2) is given by: 
(    $(    (    
( (73) 
Where the variables take identical meanings to those mentioned above. Assuming that firms 1 
and 2 share the profits equally, each one will receive half of *+. The profit of firm 3 
continues to be given by equation (5). 
Replacing (70), (71) and (72) in equations (73) and (5) we obtain the profit functions:
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Maximizing firm m’s profit in quantities, we obtain the following best reply functions: 
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Consequently, replacing (76) and (77) in equation (74) we obtain: 
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Maximising firm m’s profit and firm 3’s profit (equations (79) and (75), respectively) we 
obtain: 
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Solving (80) and (81) we get: 
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Replacing (76), (77) and (82) in equations (70), (71) and (72) we obtain the prices for the 
markets LG, LC and GC, respectively: 
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Replacing (82) in equations (79) and (75) we obtain the profits of firm m and 3, respectively: 
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Note that the profit of firm m concerns the two firms that collude. Supposing that the firms 
divide profits equally, each firm obtain: 
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3.4. Effects of an open skies agreement 
After the calculations performed in the previous Section we obtain the results for prices and 
profits of airlines for the baseline situation and under the three hypothesis tested which are 
synthesised in Table 1. We also present between brackets the impact on the price and airline 
profits resulting from the implementation of the open skies agreement. 
When comparing the results for the initial situation and the results of hypothesis H1 we 
conclude that prices on routes Lisbon - Curitiba (-./) and Sao Paulo – Curitiba (-/) should 
decrease. Thus, the entry of an international airline in the market Sao Paulo - Curitiba 
(domestic) and consequently on the route Lisbon - Curitiba, that is, increased competition on 
routes Lisbon - Curitiba and Sao Paulo - Curitiba, should lead to a decrease in prices on these 
routes. However, the effect on prices in the market Lisbon – Sao Paulo (-.) is not obvious as 
in the previous cases. In the case of this market segment, the findings in regard to price 
evolution between the base situation and the scenario presented by hypothesis H1 depend on 
some variables. Thus, for the same value of a, that is, for the same reserve price on the market 
LG, if airlines are not efficient, having high marginal costs (c), and if b (reserve price in the 
market GC) is very low relatively to a due to, for example, the segment GC being short and 
having a lot of substitutes (other means of transportation to accomplish the same journey), the 


price in the market LG may increase after the open skies agreement. Note that since in this 
market segment the open skies agreement does not introduce additional competition, there is 
no pressure to reduce the price. 
Table 1: Equilibrium prices and firms’ profits under the four scenarios 
 Prices Firms’ profits 
Before 
liberalisation 
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  	  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  	  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  	  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  	   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
  	
 
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
# 
  	   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

  	   (↓) 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"
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
	   ↑
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Legend: ↑ - increase; ↓ - decrease; ? – ambiguous effect 
Source: own calculation  
It is noteworthy that, as expected, the price of a journey between Lisbon and Curitiba will be 
lower under the hypothesis H1, since the entire route (Lisbon - Curitiba) is offered by the 
same airline. This result is in line with the conclusions drawn by Cournot (1838), that is, in 
the case of two complementary goods (route Lisbon - Sao Paulo and Sao Paulo - Curitiba) 
being produced by a single firm, the prices will be lower and the quantities higher. This 
results from the process concerning the dual margin / marginalization in complementary 
goods that is with the internalisation of the two complementary services in the same firm the 


double margin ceases to exist, benefiting consumers. In this case, firm 1 offers two 
complementary services or a trip for the entire route. The decrease in price for the market 
Lisbon - Curitiba is beneficial to consumers, which is also consistent with the conclusions of 
Cournot (1838). One of Cournot’s main conclusions relates to the fact that consumer surplus 
is higher when two complementary goods are produced by the same firm rather than being 
produced by different companies. With regard to profits, the firm that produces the two 
complementary goods will have higher profits than the sum of the profits of the two firms, 
when the complementary goods are produced by two different firms (Cournot, 1838). 
When comparing the results for firms’ profits we can conclude that the profit of firm 1 is 
expected to increase under hypothesis 1, compared with the situation without an open skies 
agreement. However, the same does not occur with the profits of firms 2 and 3, since these are 
expected to decline after the entry of firm 1 in the market GC. This decline will be due to 
increased competition and lower prices in this market segment. 
From this we can draw two important conclusions for the effects of open skies agreements: 
On the one hand, if there are time lags for new airlines to operate all routes of the market, 
while others can, firms that cannot compete on the new routes will be affected negatively 
because they see their profits decrease. The same happens if there are temporal gaps of 
airlines in designing and implementing their strategies. Moreover, it is noticed that in general 
consumers should benefit after an open skies agreement. This occurs in segments Sao Paulo 
Curitiba and Lisbon - Curitiba due to a decrease in ticket prices in these markets. However, in 
the segment Lisbon – Sao Paulo, which remains a monopoly of firm 1, prices can increase, 
according to the conditions mentioned above (efficiency and reserve price). Please note that 
this price increase is not caused by any efficiency gap, but because the airlines are all 
inefficient. 
Comparing the results between the initial situation and the hypothesis H2 we realize that 
prices in the three market segments decrease after the implementation of an open skies 
agreement, thus benefiting consumers in all markets. These findings confirm the expected 
effects presented in the literature. As expected, increasing competition in the market LG leads 
to a reduction in price. In the market Lisbon - Curitiba, the price decrease is due to the process 
of double margin of complementary goods mentioned above, to which must be added the fact 
that in this hypothesis there is competition in this market which did not happen in the baseline 
scenario (before the open skies agreement). In the market segment GC, despite the effect via 
complementary products, there are three airlines in this market so also this segment is 
witnessing increased competition that will result in a decrease in the price.  

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With regard to airline profits, the effects of liberalisation of the international market are not 
uniform. While the profit of firm 2 increases (under the hypothesis H2), firm 3 is hampered 
by market deregulation, seeing its profit decline (contrary to expectations). As is known, the 
profit of firm 3 depends on the price of market GC, which, for the reasons given above, 
should decrease. Thus, it is expected that, despite the liberalisation of the international 
market, the entry of firm 1 in the market GC (and consequent increased competition) and the 
entry of firm 2 in the market LG, and hence the entry of firms 1 and 2 in the market Lisbon - 
Curitiba, harm firm 3, leading to a reduction in its profit. Finally, the profit of firm 1 increases 
if a (the reserve price in the market LG) is not much higher than b (reserve price in the market 
GC). This result is due to the trade-off between the complementarity effect (double 
marginalization, mentioned above) regarding firm 1 and the effect of the existence of 
competition, as firm 2 also operates in this market. The effect of double marginalization 
exerts a pressure on the profit of firm 1 to increase, but the existence of competition should 
introduce a pressure to decrease the profit of this firm. Thus, if a is not much higher than b, 
that is if the market size of GC is not too small in relation to market size of LG, the effect of 
the internalization of complementarities prevails, increasing the profit of firm 1. If the market 
GC is very small relative to the market LG (a to much higher than b) then the effect of the 
existence of competition prevails, and in this case the profit of firm 1 does not increase. 
When comparing the results of the initial situation with the results of hypothesis H3, it can be 
concluded that once again the prices in the market segments Sao Paulo - Curitiba and Lisbon - 
Curitiba decrease while the effect in the price of the segment Lisbon – Sao Paulo is not clear. 
In the case of the market Lisbon - Curitiba, the price decrease is related to the fact that 
consumers go to pay a single price. At first, without the open skies agreement, firm 1 
competed with firms 2 and 3 in complementary services (Lisbon - Sao Paulo and Sao Paulo - 
Curitiba) and therefore had double marginalization. But the liberalisation of the international 
market leads to the internalisation of the two complementary services in the "same firm" 
(though in collusion) thus prices decrease and consumers are benefited, for the reasons given 
above. It is noted that the literature does not mention this fact, hence it is a new result of this 
study. In the case of the Sao Paulo - Curitiba market, the price decreases, benefiting 
consumers in this market segment, which is in line with the effects expected from the 
literature which predict that the implementation of an open skies agreement will benefit 
consumers. With regard to market Lisbon – Sao Paulo, price evolution between the base 
situation and the scenario presented by hypothesis H3 is similar to that of hypothesis H1: for 
the same value of a (the reserve price on the market LG), if airlines have high marginal costs 
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(c), and if b (reserve price in the market GC) is very low relatively to a, the price in the 
market LG may increase after the open skies agreement.  
Analysing these results of airlines’ we can conclude that in this case, after the liberalisation of 
the market, the profits of firms 1 and 2 increase. This increase was expected since the goal of 
the collusion is to maximise the joint profits of the companies, but also adds the effect of the 
elimination of double marginalization in complementary products, which allows an increase 
in profits of both airlines. Finally, the profit of firm 3 decreases after the open skies 
agreement. Thus, it is expected that, despite the liberalisation of the market, the collusion 
between firms 1 and 2 harms firm 3. Again it is clear that the airlines that stay out of the 
liberalisation process, by failing to operate new routes after the open skies agreement, will be 
affected negatively due to the reduction of their profits. 
In short, through the model developed and the hypotheses examined, it was found that, as 
expected according to the literature, the prices of the routes Lisbon - Sao Paulo and Lisbon - 
Curitiba (international routes) should decrease, thus benefiting consumers of these markets, 
particularly when liberalisation increases competition in the market, as is the case analyzed in 
hypothesis 2.  
Regarding airlines, although the trend appears to be an increase in the profits of those that are 
able to enter new routes after the agreement, the airlines that do not have the ability to 
compete for new routes will be affected, seeing their profits shrink, which contradicts the 
effects expected in the literature. 
4. Conclusions 
Since the 1970s we have witnessed a gradual liberalisation of the air transport market through 
the implementation of open skies agreements. The literature on these agreements (Brattle 
Group, 2002; Fu et al., 2010) identifies several effects that tend to occur as a result of 
liberalisation, such as increased competition, lower costs, increased efficiency and lower 
prices. However, there are several factors that can prevent the achievement of the expected 
effects of such an agreement, such as strategic behaviour adopted by incumbents, the 
restructuration of networks and frequent flier programs, limited airports’ capacity, among 
others. 
In this study we have also analysed some evidence concerning the effects of an open skies 
agreement, from which it is understood that it takes time for the effects of such agreement to 
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fully materialise. According to Cristea and Hummels (2011) this period will be at least five 
years, the time required for the market to readjust to the new conditions and reach the new 
equilibrium. 
From the theoretical model developed and the hypotheses studied we can conclude that after 
the implementation of an open skies agreement prices should decline on international routes 
where there is an increase in competition, thus benefiting consumers in these markets. This 
decrease in prices and increased consumer surplus is in agreement with that expected by the 
literature and is also due to the effect of double marginalization. Under the hypothesis H1 
(entry of firm 1 in the market Sao Paulo - Curitiba), consumers should benefit due to the 
decrease in prices in the segments Sao Paulo – Curitiba and Lisbon - Curitiba. However, in 
the segment Lisbon - Sao Paulo prices may increase because this market segment remains a 
monopoly of firm 1. Under the assumption H2 (entry of firm 1 in the market Sao Paulo - 
Curitiba and entry of firm 2 in the market Lisbon – Sao Paulo), an open skies agreement 
would lead, as expected, to a decrease in prices in all markets, which benefits consumers of 
all routes. Under the hypothesis H3 (collusion between firms 1 and 2), liberalisation of an 
international market tends to benefit consumers. Although in the market segment Lisbon - Sao 
Paulo prices may increase, harming consumers, in the international route Lisbon - Curitiba the 
consumer surplus is expected to increase due to the decrease in ticket prices in this market. It 
should be noted that the literature does not mention this decrease in market prices in the 
markets Lisbon - Curitiba (for a case of collusion between two airlines), so this effect it is a 
new result of this study. 
With regard to airline profits, the results obtained show a tendency for an increase in profits 
of airlines that get into new routes after the agreement. However, airlines that do not have the 
ability to compete for new routes after the liberalisation of an international market should be 
negatively affected, seeing their profits decline. Under the hypothesis H1, the profit of firm 1 
(which operates more routes after the agreement) should increase, however the opposite 
should occur with firms 2 and 3. Therefore, if there are time lags for new airlines to operate 
all routes of the market, while others can do it, companies that cannot compete on new routes 
will be affected negatively, watching their profits decrease. The same happens if there are 
temporal unevenness of airlines designing and implementing their strategies. Under the 
hypothesis H2 an open skies agreement leads to an increase in profit for firm 2. However, the 
liberalisation of the international market lead to decreased profits for firm 3 and profits of 
firm 1 may increase or decrease. This result for the profit of firm 1 is due to the trade-off 
between the effect of complementarity (double marginalization) and the effect of the 
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existence of competition, as firm 2 also operates in this market. Thus, if the effect of double 
marginalization is greater than the effect of the existence of competition, the profit of firm 1 
increases. Under the hypothesis H3, profits of firms 1 and 2 increase after the liberalisation of 
the international market. However, once again, firm 3 (the firm that doesn’t have the ability to 
operate more routes after the open skies agreement) will be harmed due to the reduction of 
their profits.
Thus, some of the effects of liberalisation of the international market are influenced by market 
conditions and they will not occur in all scenarios analysed. However, it is expected that in 
general an open skies agreement benefit consumers and harm the airlines that do not have the 
capacity to operate flights on new routes. These results have important implications, 
particularly for TAP, the Portuguese airline. If this airline is able to operate new routes, that 
is, routes between airports in Brazil (domestic airports), it will benefit by an increase in its 
profits, since currently it does not operate such flights. 
Regarding the limitations of this study it is important to highlight the fact that the multilateral 
open skies agreements or those between blocks of countries are still quite recent, so there has 
been little time to conduct empirical findings in order to validate the existing theoretical 
arguments. Moreover, there is little theoretical analysis on the liberalisation of air transport 
markets, which is also a limitation of this study because it is not possible to compare our 
results with those of other authors. 
As for future work, some of the suggestions here relate to the model. It will be important and 
interesting to study other cases, such as the existence of greater competition in the market 
before the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, it seems appropriate that after enough 
years, empirical studies are carried out with the aim of determining whether in fact there is a 
decrease in prices and if this does not occur only at the time when companies readjust to the 
new market conditions. It will also be important to analyse what happens to supply and 
demand, particularly studying the response of demand to changes in supply.  
Finally, it should be noted that this study is a pioneering work, since to the best of our 
knowledge there is little literature (theoretical or empirical) focusing on this subject and, 
particularly, there is no model of Open Skies. The model developed here can thus serve as a 
starting point for future work in this area. 
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